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Aprtl 13, 1976

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE
THE END OF AN ERA: ASIA-A YEAR
AFTER THE FALL OF INDOCHINA
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pres:ldent, on
April 10, 197.5, In an address to a Joint
5ei!Sion. Preslden t Ford asked Congress
to approve an additional $1 bUlion In
military and economic aJd !or South
Vietnam. The next day, American Embassy personnel were evacuated from
Phnom Penh. The end of an era was at
hand. By the last o! that month-just a
year ago-It was all over. In Saigon and
Phnom Penh, the governments of General Thieu and Lon Nol were out and new
goV!Ernments were ln. Thus ended the
final chapter in the d~astrous policy to
contain a nonaggressive China.
Where do we stand in Asia a year
later? What lessons have been learned
!rom this attempt to interfere in vast
lands &nd peoples hal! way around the
globe? It Is time to take stock.
Since former President Nixon's visit to
Pekin&" in 1972, winds of change have
blown throughout Asia. After more than
two decades of hostlllty and confrontation, the United States and China began
the Journey to normalization of relations, a Journey far from completed. At
last, our Nation's pollcy Is now grounded
on the fact that the United States is not
an Asian power but a Pacific power. The
difference is more than ~~emantic. It Is
the difference between a sensible acceptance of the realities o! Asia and the dangerous llluslons of mllitary omnipotence.
What takes place In this vast region Is
of concern to Americans. But concern
and control are quite dl.fferent matters.
Simply stated, America's principal
long-range interests in the Far East are
to avoid domination of the region by any
single power, to maintain friendly relations with China, Japan and other nations, and to lessen tensions which could
trigger either a local or a great power
confilct in the area.
Let us first look at the People's Republlc of China, the home for one quarter
o! the people on this globe. Former President Nixon's journey was only the first
step on the path to normalization of relations with China. The Shanghai communique was not a document of flesh
and blood. It was a skeleton to which the
sinews were to be added by both countries. In the 4 years since that document
was issued, some flesh has been added
in the form of trade, cultural, educational and scientific exchanges and visits
to China by government officials, Including members of Congress. But the basic
myth of the old China policy, the obstacle
to normalization of relations with the
People's Republlc o! China, remains. The
United States, officiallY, still treats the
governi!lent of Taiwan as the government of China.
The pertinent provision in the Shanghai communique reads:
The Un1!«1 States acknowledgea that all
Chinese on el ther side of the Talw&n Strait
mnlntaln there Is but one Chin& &nd that
Talwtm Ia put of China. The Un1ted Statee
Government does not ch&llenge th&t pos1tlon. It roatllrms lte lnrere..t ·In a peacetul
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settlement or the Taiwan question by th&
Chinese themalves. With this prospect In ·,
mind.. It &tllrtns the ultlm&te objective Qt the
wtthdr&wal of all U.S. force& &nd mtllt&ry
lnst:allatlona trom Taiwan. In the meutln1e,
It w1ll p~vely reduce Ita forces and mllltary lnetall&tlona on Taiwan a.s the ten~lon
In the area dlmln1shes.

I interpret the Shanghai communique
to mean that the United States recognized that the Chinese civil war was over
and that the eventual goal was full and
formal Bormal!zation of relations between the People's Republic of China and
the United States.
President Ford said In Honolulu last
December 7 that on hls recent visit to
China, he "reaffirmed the determination
of the United States to complete the
normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China on the basis of
the Shanghai communique."
The Shanghai communique staLed
that the United States would "progressively reduce Its forces and military installation on Taiwan as the tension in
the area diminishes." With the end of
the war in Indochina, "tension in the
area" wbJch, conceivably, could have
Justified retention of U.S. forces on Taiwan ended. But there are still some 2,500
American servicemen on that island,
down from 10,000 in 1972.
In addition to the regular forces, the
United States maintains a military advisory ml.!s1on to advise the Taiwan
forces on how best to tight the forces of
the People's Republic. We also continue
to supply Taiwan with large quantities
of weapom, •611 million worth over the
last 4 years, much of that financed on
long--term government credits. The admlnlstration proposes to sell $182.5 million more in military equipment to Talwan by the end of the next fiscal year,
$43 mJII1on of that on credlt.
Looking eastward, the partnership between the United States and Japan is the
fundamental pillar o! American policy
in Asia. Japan and the United States are
military partners. Japan's continued
trust in the validity of the U.S. secUl·ity
co=ltment is essential to the maintenance of stability throughout the region
because a Japan embarked In search of·
security on Its own by way of a major
military expansion would unsettle all of
Asia. Japan Is almost wholly dependent
on foreign raw materials to supply Its
greatly expanded Industrial plant. Asian
memories of the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere are still not forgotten.
There are now pressures from the Pentagon !or Japan to exPand its m!lltary
forces. I urge the greatest caution In
pushing Japan in such a direction. There
ought not to be grounds for Japan to
have to doubt the US. security guarantee and no compelling reason for the
Japanese to make a significant change
in their defense policy. Any other course,
in my judgment, Is playing \':lth fire In
the Western Pacific.
I am deeply concerned about the fallout from the Lockheed afl'a!r on United
States-Japan relations. This episode and
other recent examples of payoffs In
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shady American business deals abroad
demonstrate the need for reforms inside
this Nation and an international code
of business ethics. This is an appropriate
problem for the United Nations to tackle.
Both buying and selling nations should
·unite. to seek a remedy to cure the dry
rot which now afflicts international business dealings.
As to the present situation. it is in the
interest of all concerned that American
and Japanese officials handle the problem in such a manner as to minimize the ·
adverse impact on our relationship.
Maintenance of a close partnership with
Japan should continue to have the highest priority in U.S. policy toward Asia.
Korea, the last remnant of the failure
of U.S. policy in Asia, is a time bomb
whioh must be defused. The U.S. objective should be to bring about a settlement between the two Koreas and, In
the inte11m, to ease tensions and lessen
the possibility for a resumption of hostilities. U.S. policy should not be hostage to
any particular government in Korea, or
anywhere else for that mater. That lesson should have been learned, finally, in
Indochina and Cambodia where two generals, Thieu and Lon No! became the
tail that wags the dog. Are we to suffer
the same experience in Korea?
Nearly a quarter of a century after the
end of the Korean war, over 40,000
American troops remain in Korea, at a
cost to the taxpayers of $580 million
annually. Many are on the DMZ line in
positions which would automatically
thrust the United States into the thick
of the fighting should hostilities between
North and South break out again. Indeed, they are there for precisely that
purpose-as a tripwire. U.S. nuclear
weapons are also stored ·in South Korea,
according to former Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger, adding to the dangers of the
situation. Our forces in this last bastion
on the Asian mainland should be reduced
over a period of time and all nuclear
weapons. in my judgment, should be removed. In the meantime, the United
States should reexamine the tripwire
ooncept at the DMZ. It may be that a
more appropriate approach might be to
seek to negotiate an even wider demilitarized zone.
The United States must do more than
it has in the past to break the impasse in
Korea. We should have learned f.r om the
long and costly efforts to contain the
People's Republic of China that quarantine is a reaction, not a substitute for a
positive policy which seeks to solve a
problem. It is in the interest of the Korean people, North and South, for the
United States and world peace, that contact be made between the two Koreas
to help to minimize the risk of military
clash and to facilitate an accommodation between North and South.
Some months ago, the North Korean
Government did make a move to establish a contact with South Korea through
a meeting of the Red Cross organizations
in both countries.
According to the Christian Science
Monitor yesterday, South Korea has
proposed to the North an exchange of
ancient art exhibits in what appeared
to be a new initiative toward norma!iz-

ing relatio,ns. I would hope, Mr. Presi-
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which tb.e treaty has practical applicadent, that that trend would continue be- tiort, all add U.P to a sensitive and volatween North and South Korea.
tile situation for the United States in
In Southeast Asia, the foremost task Thailand.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there are
for U.S. policy remains to recognize the
realities iii Indochina. The administra- no major policy problems. Burma contion's policy of opposition to trade and tinues to go its own way and Its government has no desire to open its doors to
commer~al relations with Vietnam or
Cam'bodia, and the failure to send an large-scale foreign economic intervenAmbassador to Laos has something in tion, by the United States or any other
it of the ostrich complex. The fact is country. -There is in Burma, however , a
that just as China was not ours to lose danger that overzealous and costly purin 1949, neither was Indochina a quarter suit of poppies may result not so much in
of a century later. That was not the the lessening of the supply of dangerous
tragedy for us. The tragedy was that the drugs but in involving this. nation in
war was allowed to begin and to con- Burma's internal affairs and the continue so long and that so many live~ tinued fignt of the government against
various Insurgencies. A close rein should
were needlessly lost.
Although the shooting war is over, be kept on antinarcotics activities, both
economic warfare continues as a corner- there and elsewhere in the region. In
stone of U.S. policy. There is no way the Philippines, the outstanding problem
that a unilateral U.S. trade embargo concerns the ·terms for continued use of
ag-ainst Vietnam or Cambodia can be the military bases at Clark and Subic
effective in a competitive world. Contain- Bay. Appropriate recognition of Philipment is not a policy. It is only a petulant pine sovereignty is the issue here. Negoreaction. It is time that the United tiations to meet this issue were begun
States act toward the governments of yesterday between the two countries. I
Indochina, which have regained their believe that a mutually satisfactory
independence, in a spirit which seeks agreement can be reached, given the
to heal the wounds of war. Like it or not, fact that we want to stay and the Phila unified Vietnam, as North and South ippine Government wants us to stay.
United States-Indonesian relations are
will ultimately become, will be a major
trouble free. But this land of
force in Southeast Asia. It is in our long- relatively
140 million people has a growing gap berange interest to accommodate to this
tween rich and poor which vast amounts
fact and make the best out of the new of foreign aid, new oil revenues, and outsituation.
investments seem only to have acI share the desire of all Amer.icans to side
centuated.
learn whatever can be learned of the
In both the Philippines and Indonesia
missing in action in Indochina. But we
can hardly expect to do so by refusing the debacle · in Indochina, coupled with
to have anything to do with the new the change in U.S. policy toward China,
governments of Laos, South and North has stimulated new interest in regional
Vietnam, or Cambodia. The most effec- cooperation and a reappraisal of basic
tive way to obtain information about the international relationships. As new reMJA's, I should think, is through face- lationships evolve in Southeast Asia, a
to-face, on-the-spot official dealings. new spirit of self-reliance and regional
That is not likely without normalization cooperation is emerging. It is in our own
of diplomatic and other relations. It is interest to encourage and accommodate
my understanding that the administra- to this new spirit. One of the most promtion has decided to open talks With Viet- ising developments is the growth of the
nam on the range of issues between us, Association of Southeast Asian Nations,
and that is certainly a step in the right or ASEAN, con,prised of Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
direction.
Singapore. This genuinely local arrangeIn Thailand, the United States faces a ment, is showing much promise. Aldelicate situation. The question of a con- though the recent summit meeting of the
tinued American military presence has heads of state did not produce any startbecome a major issue in internal politics, ling agreements, it did reaffirm a mutual
a further manifestation of the forces of desire to explore and develop common
nationalism at work in Southeast Asia. regional interests. Expanding its memAll U.S. forces, except for a small mili- bership to include Burma and the natary assistance group, have been ordered tions of Indochina, a future possibility,
to leave the country within the next would result in a regionwide organiza4 months, thus bringing to a close an tion of great potential. A regional zone
attempt to maintain a second military of peace and freedom, encompassing all
toehold on the Asian mainland. The ac- the nations of Southeast Asia, would be
tion taken by the Kukrit government is a giant step toward regional stability.
both in their interest and in the interests
"Those who cannot remember the past
of the American people.
are condemned to repeat it,'' Santayana
The closing of the U.S. bases may help wrote. The era of military adventure on
to improve the prospects for an easing the Asian mainland is over. As a result
of tensions between Thailand and North of VIetnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the
Vietnam, an arrangement much to be American people now have a more readesired. What the new Thai Government listic view of what, as a practical matter,
will do remains to be seen.
we can and cannot do. They now know
The remnants of U.S. military involve- that it is not possible, or even desirable,
ment, a smouldering insurgency in the to remake ancient cultures in our own
northeast, a genuine fear of North Viet- image. There is a sober realization of
nam's intentions, and the continued the limits of America's resources and
existence of the SEATO treaty commit- power. As was true of America in the
ment to Th¥land, the only country to past, the America of the future will be
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tlle beacon to U1e world, not because of
its military might or !oreJ.gll aid diplomacy, but becau.•e of what it stands for
in furtilermg human aspirations for
freedom and a better v.·ay of lilt'
America Is not becoming Isolationist.
There i~. In fact, a growing awareness of
the Interdependence of the world and
U1e !'Ced to tackle common problems on
o. multilateral bMis. As U.N. SecretaryGen,ral Kurt Waldhelm put It in a recent speech: "People are not turning
away from Ideas of world interdependence. What U1ey ~tre turning away !rom
are out-moded and un\\orkable ways of
trying to deal with the world."
In summary, I would sny that the U.S.
position in Asia is more favorable than
tt has been since the end of World War
II.
First. We enjoy good relations with all
nations e-,;cept for North Korea and those
in Indochina, which we Ignore by choice.
Second. Both we and the nations o! tile
region have a better understanding of
what it takes to live In peace In a diverse
world.
Third. There Is no war.
Fourth. American troops are coming
home from the Asian mainland.
Fifth. ThP economic burden of our
overseas political involvement is lessening.
There is an agcnd.t of unfinished business, to be sure. But the problems are
manageable. What is needed Is the will
to clear away the remaining relics of outdated policies and to !nee up to the presput ~nd the future and to lenrn from tile
past. I will continue to do all I can 1n
my remaining months in this body to insure that work on t.hat agenda continues.
Mr. President, I tlSk unanimous consent that a SJ>eech I made on United
States-Chinese relat10ns and a portion
of a repm t which I made last August, released la<t October. entitled "Winds of
Change" !nvoll·ing relations in Southcast A. Ia be printed In tl1e RECORD.
Thr·re being no obirction, tile maletial
was ordered to be pr nted In the RECORD,
as follow. ·
UNIT!-0 ST."t.r£SaCIJI..,.E:Sf RLLhl"lONS

1\i.<NsFIEI.D. l\lr. Presl<.lent, I llstened
to former Secretary of Defense James St·hleslnger on a program ye,terday, and he wa;;
asked some questions about the People's Republlc o! C'hlna As I recollect, he stated that
he and some othef' hnd discussed the possibility o! armo !or the People's Republic but
that nothing bad come ot it. I Msumed. uased
on his lan~uage, that that discussion wn.s entirely w!lhln tho U 6 adm!ntstr:\tlon and
thl\t the People's R<publlc represent·•t!ves
were not I volved nnd thnt It wns something
thnt Nao <lone In relation to po s! >1lltles
whlch rntcht ro ncelv ~hl\ ensue Rt owP future time
Secretory Scllle .n er also \\ n
uuked
v.·heth r he \\OUld appro\e the sc,>dlng o!
Mms •o the People's Republ!c. H~ snl,l, In
rfTect, "We "Ill have •o race thnt question
v.·hen It ar "' , but I think It •"" 1ld be
treoa.tt"d o ..'l t'te same \:luis As t e Soviet
~lr.

un~on"

I t >o, tlhnk thnt t"e P ople Republic
•honld be trentcd on the same bas,, ns the
Soviet Unlou F'urt
more. I "ould !Ike to
see a mo t-! vorecl-n ion treaty executed
between Peking and Wu.•hlngton. I believe
that tr we ~re going to C<trther normn112e relations. ttst Is one ot the steps we should
take, though I do nc.t ~Heve that 'IH' sho\lld

ln lillY aense, In any way, In any shape, In
any form, try to force arms on Pelting.
On.e, It will be counterproductive; two,
I do not thlnk there have been &ny contacta With Pektng tn tb.&t reepeet; three. I
believe tbat the Ohtneee look upon them&elvee aa betng perfectly ca]J<'ble o! prodl>~!ng
tb.elr own armament.
The Secretary al90 tndlcated tba t so far
as nuclear weapons were concerned. we were
not bebtnd the Soviet Union. In that respect, It Is my understanding that Peking
has not been accelerating Ita nuclear progmms but bas continued to maintain a
oteady pace Bnd only !or de!eru!lve purposes.
He <lid Indicate that we were behind tn conventionAl. forces, which I 1188UJne to mean
ln!BntlT, the Army, ships, seapower, the Navy.
But I potnt out that we do have more than
2 million men under ar11l8, scattered In too
many parts ot the world, stationed there !or
too long and at too great a co&t.
I was interested in the Secretary's reference to the People's Republic, because I think
this Nation bas been paying too little attention to the nat!olll! across the Pac!.t!c. I
point out that, as tar a.a the People's Republic
Is concerned, It bas somewhere between 850
Bnd 90 mUUon people, practically one-quarter
o! the population of the globe.
At the other end of Asia, I point out that
Saud! Arabia, wlth an estimated 7 mtlllon
people, )las approximately one-fourth of the
o!l reserves In the world. So I hope we shall
pay more attention to that part of the globe,
recognize Ita significance a.a !ar as we are
concerned, and be aware o! the potentials
whlcb may arise !rom time to time. We
should keep our eyes and our ears open, so
tha.t we wUI not place undue stress on other
parts o! the world at the expense of our
relations with the Asian Continent. It Is
Important that we better understen<l what
transpires tn that part of the world.
Getting a little bit closer to home, I 1\rn
glad to note tba.t on today, negotiations are
beginning between the RepubUo o! the Ph!llppines Bnd the U.S. Government relative
to the future status o! our bases In the
Phll!pptne Republic, notably at Sublc Bay
and Clark FJeld. I have no doubt that those
negotla.ttons wUI be successful. It w1ll·'take
a Uttle give and take on both sides, but
because o! the Inherent friendship and the
deep necessity for malnta.lning these bases,
I feel quite certain that, before too long,
an amicable settlement wUJ be reached
which will satisfy both the Phll!ppine and
the American people. I wlsh to Include at
this point In the RECORD an excerpt o! a report which I made to the Foreign Relations
Committee tn October 1075. The excerpt deals
with the Phll!pplnes and the question or US.
mUit.ary bases In that country.
\\~l!'.;DS OF CHANGF.-EvOLVING RELATIONS AND

lNnHE.STS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
I. THRU VARIA'IIONS ON NEUTRALlSM

Pres!del>t Nixon's visit to Peking In 1972
released strong winds or change ln the International relnt!onshlps o! Asia. The collapse In South Vietnam and Cambodia Intensified these currents. Visible changes al·earty Include the restoration ot contMt
between the United States Bnd China lookIng ln the direction o! normalcy a.fjer many
years of acrimonious confrontation. This
shtrt has been a key !actor In enabl!ng us to
reduce the US. military pre..ence In Asia
from oome 650.000 at the height of the Indochlnn war to les.• than 60,000 at present.
1\foreover, a further reduction wUJ take place
In the months ahead n• US !orces are-" lthdrawn from Thailand.
U.S. policy, In short, Is beginning to reflect the !act that the United States ts a
Pac!.t!c nation, but not a power on the Asian
Mainland. The waters of tho Pac!.t!c touch
the shores o! the United States on the West
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Coast. at Hawaii, Alaska, the territory of
Quam an4 .the Us. trust territories. 'lbev

alSo beat agatnst the coastlines o! sevet1
nations to which we have made security comSouth Korea, Taiwan, the
Phlllpplne•. ThaUand, Australla and Nrw
Zealand-as well as the shores o! the Soviet
Union and China. What takes place In this
vast region Is o! deep concern to this nation
However, concern and capacity to lnflu~nrt
are quite dUTerent. What we began to perceive In Korea and saw very clearly In Indochina Is that our capnclty to Influence the
flow or history on the Asian Mainland 1tsel1
Js qutte limited on tho bMis or any rational
input or manpower and resources
After the birth Of the Peoples RepubliC Of
Chtna In 1949, we establlshed a policy ot
containment tn Commur.tst China. It was a
policy which sought to line up nations on an
either "!or or against" ba..•ts with "neutral·
IBm" regarded as something to be apUl'Ded.
A ring o! treaties wns engineered In an ~trort
to use u.s. power and Influence to choke off
what were held to be China'• aggressive designs on Ita neighbors, In SoutheMt Asia,
both Thalland and the PhU!pplnes linked
their foreign pol!cy directly to what became
a U.S. crusade against communism on the
Asian maiiUand. Burma and Cambodia, each
In Its own way, tried to walk the tight rope
of non-involvement. The !ormer did so
throughout the Indoch!t>a war, In part, by
reJecting U.S. and other forms of foreign
ald. Under Prince Norodom Slhanouk. Cambodia also l!eld the line o! non-Involvement
succeesfully for many years. When the Prince
was overthrown by a milltary coup, however,
the Khmers paid the cost In five yenro of
bloody war. The overthrow of Slha1touk al•o
added more U.S. cnsnalt!es and blll!ons to
U.S. costs Jn Indochina as this nation went
!rom non-Involvement to the aid of the sur·
cessor m111tary regime In Phnom Pehh.
Through Southeast Asia, nations are now
making major ~easM•6smenta of their relationships. Nationalism and neutrality, mixed
with a buddlng Interest In regional cooperation, are the driving forces at work. Neutral!sm takes on different characterl.,tlos In
each of the Southoo.•t Aslnn nations. Bnrma
Is a study of trad!t!onnl neutrality with !•
heavy a.coent on Isolationism. ThaUand, the
only nation tn the region to remnln free o'
colonial rule before World War II. Is enga~ed
In writing another chapter In Ita long history
of seeking to balance Its Independence amidst
shl!ttng political currenta. Three decade•
att~r close ai!nement with and vestigial d•·
pendency on the lJn!ted States, the Republic
ot the Ph111pp!nes 18 moving Into the more
open waters o! International relations and
accelerating Ita etrorta to achieve a !ully
Independent Identity.
As new relationships evolve In Southcn>l
Asia, naw problems are emerging among the
nt\tlons In the area and In their relations
with the United States. Changes In !Ill old
order always carry a degree of paln!ul adJustment. It Is to be hoped, however, that out
of the old, eventually wUI emerge a new
spirit o! sel!-relte.nce and regional cooperation. In that fashion, the Independent na.tlons o! the region may be able to lh·e
together In a wne of peace respect td by all
o! the great powers. That Is the goal towards
which each nation vtB!ted, In Its own way
and to some degree, all or them together,
S<'emed to be moving
The Asian nations are very likely to call
!or adjustment& o! all o! the relationships
with the West which grew out or a previous
state o! dependency. We should do our be• t
In our own interesta to accommod:1.te to
changes o! this ktnd. They Involve, In many
cases, as tn Indochina, the lightening oi an
excessive and one-sided burden which hM
been maintained !or decadee by the people
or the Unite<! States. From our own point
of view, It would bo desirable to subJect the
mltmen~apan,
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Southeast Asia CollecL!ve Defense Treaty, the
so-called Manlla Pact, to cntlcal reexamination. The treaty seems to me or little relevance to the security of this Nation in the
contemporary situation.' In fact, it may be
more a !labllity than an asset to all of the
slgna.tories. As for our relations with Indochina,.it would seem to me helpful in dealing
with the vestige.! problems of the war and
in paving the way for a peaceful future to
establish direct contact with tile successor
governQit.:nts in Vietnan1 and Can1hodia at
au appropriate tin1e.
It would be unfortunate if out of iuctq;nation or disillusionment we should turn our
backs on Asia. More iu line with our intcresLs
would be to seek io understand rnore dearly
what is transpiring on that continent. Our
young people, in particular, need as 1nuch
exposure a...~ possible to the changes in Asia
since they wlll experience in the years ahead
most of the consequences. Through diplomacy nne! cultural contacts we should be able
to harmonize our reasonable national interests in security, trade and cultural cross
fertilizati :>n with the emerging situation in
Southeast Asia. Tile present transition need
not be a source of anxiety If it is appro,.ched
in that fashion. Indeed, we could be on the
"erge of a new era wll!ch could bring great
benefits both to the Asian countriP.s and to
this Nation.
II. DUHMA

Neutrality and nonalinerncnt

Under President Ne Win, Burma has navigated a course of neutfalism and nonnlinement for many years. Its relations with the
great neighboring states of China and India
nre correct and formal o.nd the san1e i.s trne
for the Soviet Union and the United S,ates.
Burma has no intimates and seeks no.ne. It
has sought to avoid foreign entanglerrents.
Although it was an early mem~er ol the
United Nations, only in 1973 did the nation
even join the World Bank and the Asian
Development B:p1k. In the United Nations
and othe:;r international forums, Burn1a ha.c;
abstained on many divisive issues. For 'ears
it has re cogni~ed both Koreas and borh Vietnams.
Burma was an observer of what. hflpr:ned
to the Indochinese nations when they were
drawn in to great powe:r rivalries. Their tragic
experience was such as to provide proof to
the Burmese government of the correctness of
its own policy. Whatever its shortcon1ings,
this policy has served to keep Burma out
of the conflicts which have b eset otf>ers in
Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Isolated by
natural n1ountain barriers on the east, west,
and north the Burmans have been able to
preserve to a greater degree than 1nosc nations ln th~ region, tbeir traditional culture.
Speculation in Bmmu is to the effect that
tts doors nHty soon open wider. evidencing,
some say. a. change in atutude toward s the
outside world. One Bunnc~e official obst:rved
to me, however that what has happened is
"not that Burma has changed but that the
world has changed." He went on to explain
that a U.S. pollcy of detente with the Soviet
Union and the new U.S. relationship with
China slgnlficantly altered the framework of
Burmu's neutralism and made foreign contacts, n o:nblv with the United States, more
feasible.
·
Foreign ohservers, when discussing Burn1a's
economy, generally describe it as "stagnant"
or "sick." Whlle it Is obvious to a visitor that
there Is a great deal o! poverty, the u sual
economic J. o.rdsticks are not exact or even
very relevant when applled to a rice-based
agrarian society. 'I11c extremes of poor and
rich, for ex'lmple, are not seen in Bmm.a as in
m.a.ny other countries.· Burma's econmny 1s
not rocketing ahero.d but neither as in Indochina has the land been devastated and hundreds of thousands k!lled and maimed by
warfare. Also avoided so fur have been the
cultural upheavals and environmental despoilation which are often associated with

economic development via h.e&vy )nfluxes at
outstde·-cap!tal and !orelgn ald.
Nevertheless, there are inani!estations of
polltlcal d l9S8ti•faction from time to time
wJPch center in Rangoon and are probably
directed in part, at least, at the lack of economic progress and· opportunity. Three
major anti-government demonstrations by
workers and students have occurred during
the last year and a half. Colleagues and universities have been closed from t!q>.e to time
and leaders of workers demonstr~ttons have
been sentenced .to long prison terms.
Although a new Burmese Constitution was
adopted las.t year, the governn:utnt remains
based on army leadership. Sixteen of 18 cabinet officers are military or ex-military 1nen.
While farming Is st!ll on a private basis, as
are nu~ ny shops and stores. the government
runs much of the rest of the econO!llY·
Staples, such as rice, oil, and cloth are rat!onecl, with scanty allotments. This system,
plus a shortage of consumer goods generally
undergirds a so-called "shadow economy" or
black m~rket. Although stable untll the last
year or so, prices are now rising. Rice stocks
available for export, ~he country's principal
source of foreign exchange, are dwindling
due to lacl< of substantial increases in output coupled with population growth. In the
last thirty years, the population has almost
doubled to 30 million. The government is
considering new Incentives to raise rice production and recefit!y Increased the price
paid to the farmer by ·30 percent. As yet,
however, policies have not been devised to
sur mount the dllemma o! a dwindling per
capita food supply as against what Is seen
as a possible loss o! security and national
identity which might be occasioned by lim iting population growth in the midst of
towering neighbors.
One way to help alleviate this dllemma,
at least !or the inlmed!nte future, would be
by the discovery o! petroleum in exportable
quantities. After years of rejecting private
investment, last year, Burma leased offshore
tracts to two American on companies, Exxon
and Clcies Service, and two companies from
other countries. While the drilling has not
yet yielded results, the Burmese believe the
prospects are good. Burn1a is also seekin:;:
by Its own efforts to extend present onshore
oil fields which supply 70 percent of the
nation's modest current needs. The government has not shown any Interest In foreign
Involvement in the exploration for minerals,
with which, according to technlca! reports,
Burmo. is generously endowed.l
A part o! Burma's imports are presently
being financed by loans from the World Bank
and the As ian Development Bank and by 1>1lateral agreements with West Germany and
Japan. Three small Asian Development Bank
projects are now underway. While the U.S.
had not provided new dollar assistance to
Burzna since 1963, a consortium arrangement
uncler the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund which involve foreign aid
contributions by the United States, Japan,
and Western European countries is under
con"ideration.
The Burmese are in the process o! repairing the severe damage caused by an earthquake in early July at Pagan, an area of historical ""gnificanoo and the site of numerous
edifices and shrines dating from the 11th
Century. They are hampered by Jack of funda
which are being rnlsed through public subscription. Various nations have made contributions through their embaaslee in Rangoon for this very worthwhile endeavor.
Shortly before I arrived, U.S. Embassy officials had asked Washington for permL<slon to
make a small monetary contribution to assist in the repair o! the damage at Pagan.
The request was denied, apparently on some
semantic or obscure basis and the matter
was buffeted from pillar to post in the buFootnotes at end of article.
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ren.ucra 1 It ·)s amazl.ng to find that In an
Eltecu.tl · l!lraneh which frequently finds
ways unknown even to the Congress to rush
!>ens of tnll.llbns m &1i:i to shore up a sinking
reglnle as 1n the closing days of the Cambod!a.n dQbacle, is un•ble to find a basis for a
modest human .gest\U'e in the face of a natural d.iaa.ste!' such. as~ occurred in Burma last
summer. One can only note that if more authority l:S necessary to a:ct inn situation su~''
as thts, why has It n~ long since rcen requested?
.
Thfti.drug trade and tnsurecnts along the
Bumaese · border create a dangerous mixture.
Twenty groups, most of them basecl on ethnic divls.ions and some. quite small and of
little contemporary significance, are now ln
various degrees of insurrection or insubcrdinatlon with regard to the governm~nt in
Rangoon. It is possible to dlvlcle the factions
lnto flhreo basic groupings. The first type
seeks to replace the existing government and
is exem.plifled by the Burma Communist
Party. the largest single dissident element.
Typl.fl~ by the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA), & second group seeks autonomy in
ethnic areas.. The third consi&ts sinlply of autand-out drug traffiCkers and bandits, some
of whom are remnants or descendants of the
forces associated with the National Government which fled from China in 1949 and
which, for a tinle, were supported from Taiwan.
Opium IS a traditional crop In the hill area.,
of Northeast Burlna. It ls estimated that the
crop may reach 440 metric tons this year
even though the priCe is currently depressed
because o! the loss o! the Soulli Vietnamese
market. All the Insurgent groups are belleved
to be financed, at least in part, through the
drug traffic. The Chinese (Nationalist) Irr<'gu!ar Force which is stlll organized into the
3rd and 5th divisions is the most importnm
group involved in the drug traffic. Another
element is the Shan United Army, which operates in the Northern Shan states.
Each organization has its own "turf" in th•·
remote and scarcely accessible border area;~
as well as its own methods of operations. In
simpl!fied form, the cycle of operations, runq
as fo11ows: the trafficker buys the crude opium from the grower, transports it to the
Thai border, sells it, uses the proceeds tu
buy arms or other goods, brings the arms anct
goods back Into Burma, sells them on the
black market. The cycle Is completed whet•
the proceeds fr<:nn the black Inarket sale.:; nrt·
used to buy n1ore opiuin.
The Burmese governn1enL is conc1. ··11 ·-:I
with the drug traffic both because of tM•
growing consumption of drugs in the cvvntry and because suppression of the t rade
is seen as an essential element in dealing t.ffectively wlth tile insurgency problem. Af r
an initial reluctance, Burma has agTeed l o
accept eighteen helicopters which are av3 , _
able under the U.S. narcotics control IJr,•gram. Four hellcopters have been deli. en· J,
on a trial basis, and, if results are mutual!•:
satisfactory. the remainder will be turrl'·d
over, in due course, to the Burmese government.
In addition to thi6 arra.nge1nent, !.here D. avE:'
been some small Burn1ese purchases of U .S.
ml!ltary related goods. The Burmese government, however, ha.s indicated no interP-:::t
in renewal of a military aid progra1n or in
obtaining mll!tary training for its forces Ill
the Un1ted States.
A note ol caution is indicated in regard to
cooperation in drug suppres"ion. 'l'he zeal
o! U.S. enf,orcement officials in trying to get
at the.source• of drugs is understandable and
merits much applame. Nevertheless, there
are oth•r questions involved in BurmeseU.S. relatk>ns. For too long in the admlnistrat,lon of U.S. pol!c.les, we have tended to
assume reepons!bllity for problems which are
mare properl;r those of other na t!ons or o!
the International community. One form o!
involvement !n the Internal affairs o! other
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nations can lead very rapidly to other form•.
aa the bitter Indochina experience ehould
have taught us.
In my judgment. therefore. any rurt!'.er
U.S. 1\SSlstance to tore1gn countrlee for their
internal UMJ in anti-drug probletn3, 1t warranted at all. would eeem more appropriately
to be funneled through International bodies.
Whatever funds Congress thinks justified for
thls ac lvlty might weU go as a contribution
to the U.N ·a Narcotics Cor.. trol program.
~1oreover, any activity or U.S. narcotics
asents In Burma or any other nation In
SOutheast Asia, for that matter. must remain
under the strict supervision and ftrm control of the U S Amb,\&iador who Is In the
be>t position to know what practices are or
are not possible In the light or our total
relattonsblp with ti. e country concerned.
After my vis! t to Burma six years ago, I
v.-rote: '"The Burme!'e go\•er'nment continues
to go Its own way as It has for many years.
It is neither overawed by the proximity o!
powerful neighbors nor overimpressed by the
virtues o! rapid development through IarKe
in!u.slons o.t foreign aid. Burma's primary
concern Is the retention of 116 national and
cultural Identity and the development of an
economic system preponderently by Its own
efforts and along 116 own lines."
These are still the major pre-occupations
of the Ne Win government. The nation has
succeeded In maJnt!llnlng Its national and
cultural Identity. It,< economic situation.
however, is sttll very tenuous.
As for our rclatlons v.lth Burma, whllc
some strengthening of cultural and technical exchange either on a bllateral or multilateral bn.,ls may be desirable and possible.
my view I tho.t we would be well-advhed
to avoid scrupulously any Inclinations
towards a deepening tuvohement in Burmel'e affairs. Such lncllnations wouJd not
be welcomed in Burma as h· Its best interests. Clearly. too, they would not be m the
best Interests or this nation.
111. TliAll.ANO

After four decades of Intht.uy rule. Thailand Is attempting anew to forge a democratic system. At the same time, there Is
underway a major revtstotl in foreign relationships. Followtn~: student uprisings, In
O<:tober 1973. the ml11tary government of
Field Marshall Thanom Klttlkachorn was
ousted and Thanon1 and other government
leade., fied the country. ThlR development
coupled with the rapidly changing situation
In Asla, initiated by Pr.,ldent Nixon's trip
\o Peking, and culminating In the collapse
In Indochina, has brought about a sweepIng reappraisal by Thailand of lt. foreign
policy
Until the fall of I he Thanom government,
Thailand had maintained a close relatlonshlp--tJOme termed It a "client-state·• relationship-- with the United Stales. Now that
has chan~ed, with Thailand moving away
!rom the long luthnacy with the United
States and, at the same time. seeking better
relations" lth Its neighbors In Indochina and
Asia, How this land of H m1lllon people
handles the turn towards polltl<'al democracy
and a new foreign policy will have far-reaching consequences tor the over·all rela.tiouohlps In and around the Asian continent.
Political and e1·onomtc situation
Prime Minister Khukrlt Pramot, lender of
the SOcial Action Party, has ~overned Thailand slnte mld-!\!arch with a coalltlon of
eight parties. His own party. wlth only 18
seats, Is " dlstant third in terms of party
strength In the Parliament. Whlle the Thai
King. Phumlphon Adunytld.et, serves prim rlly as the symbol of national unity, the
monarchy t., otlll a !actor In state aft'alrs,
particularly, In times of crisis. The present
Thai pollt•ct\l system Is based on a Parl1ament conslstlng of 269 seats In an elected
Lower Honse and a 100-nlember appointed

Upper House. Elections earlier this year attracted •2 parties and 2,191 candidates. Predictably, the results were lnconclualve. 'There
are now representatives !rom 23 parties sitting tn the Parliament which, when I visited
It, we.s meeting In a joint session and engaged In spirited debate over an aspect of
ABEAN. Despite earlier predictions of a short
and unhappy life, the Parliamentary structure Is managing to hold together and Is
aervtng as o. vehicle for operative government.
The Khukrlt cabinet. apart trom the dlmcultles Inherent In any coalition and, especially In one emerging from the trauma of
an abrupt shift !rom military authoritarianIsm, Is subject to three basic pressures; a
volatUe student movement; long-standing
Insurgencies In the north, the northeast and
south; and the ever present posslblllty of
a mllltary coup.
The student lDOVement wields ln6uenre,
as ls often the case In Asian nations, !a.r
beyond numbers. There Is a working relationship between the students and labor on
most Issues and thi• coalition constitutes
the m06t potent force In current Thai polltics. It may be less or a !actor, however, than
It was two years ago at the time of the
ousting of the dlctator<hlp. Public reaction
In Bangkok to pa.st exce:;oes, It Is said, has
caused student leaders to be more discriminating tn choosing is.~ues on \\-hich to
exert their pressure.
One personal incident was Instructive.
When I arrived for an appointment vath the
Prime ~'lirllster. hundreds or out or work
Thai guards 1lt U.S. military basee. who are
being discharged as the bases are phased out,
were engaged tn a demonstration detnanding !Ina! pay adjustments. The guards were
not on U.S. payrolls but. rather, wer.e paid
Indirectly on the basts of U.S. contracts "lth
Thai mllltary leaders of the prevlO\IS rogltne,
some o! whom apparently have fled the
country. Since the demonstration wns taking
place In front of the Prime Minister's offices.
It was necessary to postpone the meeting
lest the presence or a vlsltln~ American otllclal trigger more serious dtt!lcultles.
Ever present In the background of Thai
politics Is thl' potential for a military coup.
While the government appeaM to command
the loyalty of the armed forces. rumors of
possible coups abound In Bangkok. PerhspA,
the principal deterrent Is the public revultlon with the rampant corruption or the
previous mllltary regime and thO" posslblllty
that a coup at this time would B!l1'1n bring
on a mUltant student-labor reaction.
The role of the mllltary has been deempha.sl.zed by the prese'lt government which
a.ppea.rs to want to dire-ct tts energies toward socl!\1 and economic- needs. Heretofore
1nuch of the go\'ernment's interest centered on Bangkok With 4 million people,
Bangkok Is Thalland's only major city and It
1s scarcely repretientat1ve or the nation The
gap between Bangkok a~:d the reM or the
country ts great. Per capita Income In the
capital, for example. Is $BOO· per year but
It Is only about e200 nationally, and It Is,
perhaps, not more than e75 per yeur 111 the
m06t troublesome Insurgent area, the northeast. There ha.s been llttle spread of commerce and Industry !rom Bangkok to the
countryside. The city, In some respects, Is
llke a !orel'(n land to mOflt Thais. Its tramc
j.•ms, westernized practices and political
ma!leuverlng are quite alien to the vlllagere
who make up the va.st majority of the
country's population.
Neglect of the vUlages Is a major ractor In
fueUng the Insurgency movements. In t.he
north the Insurgents are ethnic groups often
Involved In the drug tramc. In the northeast
the problem is peuant dJ.scontent and Thai
against Thai. In the eouth. It 1.8 largely Malay
Muslim or Chinese against Tha.lB.
Over the yee.rs, there have been any num~r of antl-4nsurgency oampe.lgna launched

by Bangkok, all llberally financed wl h US.
funds a.nd, often, abetted with advice from
varloue U.S. agenc11111. None has brought an>
appreciable results. 'lbe Insurgent movement<~
have continued to grow, with a total of pe"haps 8,600 now under arms ln. the narthea t
&lone. The Khukrlt government t>eem.s to be
aware that the problem cannot be aolved
unl068 thel"e ts more etiecttve rontact between s heretofore ren1otR government tn
Bangkok and the people In the locallt!es. It
Is trying n.ew ap.proe.ches which Include a
rorm or r&venue sharing to channel funds to
the poorest areM. Al>lo reoogmzed Is the ne<d
to change tl:le attJtudes of the umlerpt\ld and
oorrupt bu.-eaucracy In the Insurgent areas
While \t may be difficult to peroii<Hie wldler.
and pollee who have ren.ped much of the
financial benefit o! pMt antJ-lnsur• ent campaigns to beoome benefactors or villager;, 11t
least an eft'ort Is being made to brmg about
a reorlenta.tJon. The government"6 five year
plan al90 empha.slzee economic gro" th In the
rural a.rea.a a.nd reduction 1n income disparities. It remains to be seen whether the
benefits will a.etually reach th~ poople
The Thai economy bas weathered the oil
crisis, the world recession, and the phaseout.
of U.S. mll1tary Involvement In Indochln,\
Although the ra.te of lnfiatlon "a.s 20 p(rcent
in 1974, up !rom an average or l percent In
the yeare before, It has been !alllng 1\n<l
will probably be down to abot.t 10 perce11t
!or 1975. Increased ee.rnlngs !rom agricultural
exports have been a. prime factor ln count.er
lng 011 price lncreasee. The Impart r t both
tbe recession and the uncertainty ovef
polltlcal developments In the region have
been felt In the slackening of foreign Investment. Tourism, too, ts down. Nevertheles.!!
Thalll\lld enjoyed a e400 million surplus Ill
lt.s over-all balance of payment.' In 19H In
the face of a deficit of $657 mlllion In trade
The difference WM made up by foreign aid
oll conceGSion payments, touli;m and capite!
InfLows.
The United States has given Thailand largo
amounts of economic a.Jd over the year .
much of It In the last decade for the so-railed
counter-IIl.SUl'gency pro(;l'ams. Thus far. a
total ot $672 m1111on In economic aid ha'
been provided by the United States. For fisc •.t
year 1976, $12 m1lllon has been requeeted •
In an economy as formidable as Thailand's
$12 m1111on must be regarded a.s relatively
Inconsequential. The government's political
and economic pollclee are the crltlca.l !actor,
in shaping the nation's future. There would
appear, therefore, to be little relevance to
either country In the continuance or the
bilateral aid program. Indeed the tlme seems
very propltuous to end thIs vestige ot
"cllentJsm" and to place the relationship
or the two nations on & finn plane of n1nt uar
respe,..t, wlth accent on mutu,\11,. benefirhll
exchange
4

Petroleum.

TI1t:re are prospects tor major <ilfshort
petroleum strikes In the Onl! of Slam on
Thailand's east coast and In the And,lman
Sea west of the Kra Isthmus. Twenl!·five
wells have been dr1lled by Arnerlran companies In the Oulf of Slam. on hM been
found. but the potential Ia not yet ascertainable. There could be international cllt.ncultfes ln some areas since mo~t That concessions. overlap In part, territory al•o
claimed by Cambodia. Thus far. however.
there has not been any drUllng In disputed
areas. Some concessions have also bEen 1 ~
sued !or the Andaman Sea but work t.here
Ls not likely to start untU next year. Thatland ha.s already received more than •75
prospectors. Renewed consideration Is also
being given by the Thai government to a
propoet\l to join with Japan In constructing a major pipeline stretching acrose th•
Kra Llthmus, and terminating in a large
rennery which would refine Persian Gulf
crude for shipment to Japan.
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D"ugs
thus far, however, tha• this grouping will
Thailand Is a major site in the interna- include any type or joint secur!tr .arZ&Ifgetional drug problem, not so much 118 a ment. In ~bat sense it would not be a subproducer but as the route of transhipment stitute for the SEATO Organl.Ba.tlon which
of opium brought in from elsewhere tn Prim& Minister Khukrit and President PerdiSoutheast Asia. Estimates indicate that nand Marc;'?" of the PhUlppines bave urged
about· 40-45 tons of opium per year are ac- • should be phased out to make it accord. with
tually produced in Thailand. This level Is new realities In the region." This proposal, It
sufficient only to meet local demand.
ooould be· noted, relates only to the organIZed activities under the Southeast Asian
Although some Thai officials may still be Treaty an<J the large headquarters staff In
parties to the drug trade, the. level of In- Bangkok. It does not invqlve a · renunciation
vol:vement is reported to be much lower of. the aotual treaty, the so-ca.ll.el1 Manll&
than in the past. Contrary to the s1tuatwn Pact. Thailand 1s the only signatory in the
ln Burma, drugs do not seem to be a Stgnifi- area., however, to which the Pa.at now has
c'l.nt source of financial support for in- practical application lnBo!ar as a u.s. secusurgents but, rather, a means for per'iOnal rity commitment is concerned. P&l<istan reor syndwate enrichment.
nounced the treaty ·several years ago and
Thailand receives equipment fr0m tile the Philippines, Australia, and New zealand,
United States under the narcotics control are tied to the United Stats by other defense
program. In fiscal year 1975, $4.8 million arrangements.
was provided, with $3.7 mlllion more proThe security relationship between the
grr.mmed for FY 1976. Bangkok Is a regional United States and Thalland 1s complicated
headquarters for the U.S. Drug Enforcement by the exlsten~ of the 1962 Rusk-Thanat
Agency (DEA) which is active throughout communique In which the obligations of the
Southeast Asia. The agency has a regional Manila Pact were held to l>e both joint and
budget of $500,000, but the figure does not several. Under that interpretation, It would
Include assistance to other governments seem, the multilateral SEATO treaty would
which runs Into the mlllions. There are 26 also amount to a bilateral U.S.-Tbai treaty.
U.S. agents in Thailand and they are in- Thus, the treaty, potentially, has far more
volved in operational actions as well as in- signltlcance than the "scrap of p~." as it
te!llgence gathering. The day before my 1s often called today. An attack, for example,
anival, fo1· example, U.S. agents and Thai by an enemy In Southeast Asia could conpolice had carried out a joint raid on an ceivably lead to a Thal call on the United
opium refinery.
States to come to Its aid notWltbstandlng
This sort of u.s. anti-drug acti vities in the disinclination of any other of the signaThailand seems to be highly dubious. Quite tortes to do so.
·
apart from the expenditure of U.S. funds, the
The facl> 1s tha·t the ManUs Pact was born
direct participation by U.S. agents in police of an old and now altifed view of China. It
activities within Thailand amounts to in- Is of no current relevance to U.S. interests in
volvement in internal Thai affairs. While it A>lla. Left In abeyance It Is, perhaps, a source
undoubtedly Is meritorious in objective, it of potential mischief or embarrassment. We
is a foot-in-the-door, a point of entry which would be well-advised, therefore, to recould lead to extensions and in the e1,d, re- examine this agreement forthwith, with a
newed entrapment in the internal affairs of view to its termination. ,
that nation at renewed cost to the people
It should be n,oted in this connection that
of tile United States. The sorry history of Prime Minister Khukrit has ca.lled for the
mllltary and economic aid and other ac- complete withdrawal of the 19,000 U.S. mlllti vity In Indochina and Thall and over the tary forces In Thalland by the end ot March
past two decades should serve as a precau- 1976. Some references, however. have been
tion in this respect. Pollee actions, includ- made to the possible retention of a standby
ing local drug enforcement, are functions of capacity at the U Taphao Base, manned by
Indigenous governments. If there Is a U.S. a small caretaker force.
role, it should be limited to the exchange of
For more than a decf!.de my view has, been
information and lntelllgence with appropri- that the t1nited States 1,;_ Its own interests
ate Thai or other officials. Beyond that point, should withdraw mUlt~lly from the SouthU.S. financial assistance for anti-drug op- east Asian mainland "lock stock and barrel "
erations at whatever level may be set by the It remalna my judg,;,_ent that it is not 1n the
Congress, in my judgment, 1s best channeled Interest of this nation nor, probably, in the
through international or reg1onal organlza- interest of Tha.lland to have a u.s. capacity
tlons.
retained at any of the installations In ThaiForeign policy and United. States-Thai
land. There should be no toe-hold which
relations
would ~erve as a potential source of reinPresident Nixon's trip to Peking and the volvement of U.S. military forces on the
end of U.S. involvement in Indochina have Southeast Aslan Mainland.
created a new mllleu for Thai foreign pollcy.
LaoS'-Tfu! sands run out
From direct llnks and Intimate cooperation
It has been said that in Laos the French
with the United States In matters of secu- laid foundations of sand and that we tried
rlty, Thailand has moved towards a neutral to build on them. As seen from Thailand,
position. An effort is now being made by the sands ·have run out. Since the fall of
Bangkok to assure goqd relations with all Cambodia' and · South Vietnam. the Pathet
the major powers. A case in point was Prime Lao have rapidly expanded their control of
Minister Khukrit's vlslt to Peking in July Laos. The advance occurred without much
which resulted In the establishm~nt of diplo- resistance or bloodshed, with the opposition
matte relations with China. So, too, was the tending to evaporate or flee the country.
official protest to the United States over the Three of the five government muttary comuse of Thai bases in the Mayaquez affair. That manders had left the country by early AuIncident, moreover, was followed by a de- gust and another left shortly afterwards.
mand for the complete withdrawal of U.S.
In the caopital of VIentiane, the Pathet
forces from Thailand.
Lao have also extended their control of the
The outcome ot the Indochina war was not coalition central government. Prlnle Minisonly a factor In the new Thai approach to ter Souvanna Phouma Is still In nominal
China, it also resulted in Intensified Inter- command but he Is reported to be virtually
est In closer association with the Southeast powerless. The King remains on the throne
Asian nations. Within five months after tak- but Is said not to play a political role. Laoa
Ing office, Khukrlt visited not only Peking is now described as a "Democratic People's
but a.ll of the ASEAN countries. Tha.lland Kingdom."
Joined In support of the propoea.l to cre&te
U.S. relations with Laos are stra.lned and
In Southeast Al!la a zone of "peace, freedom. mlnlma.l following the torcett cl~ng of U.S.
and mrutrallty" which would be guaranteed ald operations last June. The size of the U.S.
by the great powers. There 1s no indicatio• mission dropped from 800 (Including de-
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penelen18) in AprU 1915 'to 32 by mid-August.
~t there are also some 50
other Americans without official status remAining In Laos. U.S. IIBS!stance Is not betn;;
provided to Laos 118 a result or a prohibition
conta.lnett in the continuing appropriations
resolution for FY 1916. The new u.s. Amba.s.saclor to .Iiaos has been confirmed by the
Senate, but u of late-summer had not yet
boon ordered to hi.s post. In this fashion, "
U.S. involvement of 22 years which cost billlona ot dollats and many lives is drawing to
a close·.
EXactly twenty years ago, in 1955, on tlw
occasion of a third visit to Laos, I reported to
the Oemmittee as follows:
" • • • military aid policies which seek t•)
do ·more than bulwark the security forceo
to the point where they can cope with armed
minorities sud stop occasional border sallies
seem to me to be highly unrealistic. By the
same token eeonomic aid programs which attempt to move an ancient past<)ral country
overnight from the age of the oxcart to tnat
of the airplane are equally unsound to say
the least. Both, in attempting to do too
much;· In my opinlun, can do Incalculable
It · Is estlma.te<l

harni..

"In Laos as ln Cambodia, there has been
an enormous Increase ln United States activity and in the size of the (U.S. official)
mission during the past year. At the time of
my first vlslt to Vientiane in 1953, there were
two Americans In the entire country. Now
(1955) there are some 45. Accordingly, I recommend that the Executive Branch, "" in
the case ot Oa.mbodla. review the extent of
our activity ln Laos and the size of the mls··
slon with a view to keeping both within thr•
realm of the rea.sonable ... '
IV. UNITED STATES-PHII,..IPPINE RELATIONS

The Philippines have seen Incursions of
many peopels---Borneans, Indians, Chinese,
Arabs, Indonesians, Spaniards, Americans
and others. All have left traces, large and
small, In the nation's culture. or these, the
American Is, of course, the most recent and
one of the strongest. The impact which resulted therefrom Is only now In the process
of being fully absorbed into the mainstream
ot Filipino Ute.
In the sphere of government-to-government relations, for example, there are stlll
u.s. controlled and operated military bases
In the Philippines. Until very recently, too,
special trade and Investment arrangements
. were tn, effect. In these, and in other · ways,
aspects of the pre-World War II dependent
relationship were carried over for three decades In a sort of half-way house to full
Independence.
The Republic of ·the Phllipplnes 1s now
clearly on the final stretch of that course.
At hom&, the political system transplanted
from the United States is no longer operative In its original form. Abroad, what was
once a.n almost automatic concurrence in
the course ot U.S. foreign policy has been
replaced by a pursuit ot independent Phlllpplne national objectives. Whlle not . abandoning defense agreements with the United
States, Phlllpplne foreign policy 1s presently
aimed at establishing good relations wl th
all the great powers and stronger cooperatives arrangements In Southeast Asia, as
well as with other developing nations.
Foreign policy and United States-Philippine

relations
While the sudden end of the U.S. Involve·
ment In Indochina appears to have produced thi<l sh1tt In Philippine foreign policy,
the fact Is that- the changes have been underway tor a long time, In a larger perspective, they can be seen to emerge from
the sense of Phlllppine nationalism and
A>lian identity which has been growing for
many yearn. Heretofore, these inner forces
were not readily percel ved because of the
Footnotes at end ot article.
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tbe Urilled part or on the part ot l4anJl& to terminate --s. ~. hu 'eet"'fed as eiiJ&f a-

Footnotes at end of article.

matic. In thls oonnectlon, the tonttnued one '"loUJided on -1&1 )u.stlce, the equal
preeence of U.s. forces at Clark Field and the sbartng Of Ule I.Dc1'emen te of de'l'elopmen t.
Sublc Ba.y Nava.l Bue doee act a.s something an4 p&JiMipawry democra.cy" wt th refomu;
of an assurance of our Immediate involve- In Ule ..,._ ol "peace and order; land r&m ent In any attack on the l.slanda.
torm; e""nomlo c!e-..klpment; the enhanceThe Air Force Base at Clark Field , 52 miles ment of ...,..I value&; government reorgnnorth ot Manila. spreads over 131,000 acres, nlmtton; educational reforms, and eoclal
mak1ng It greater tn size than the combined aervkea.• Although the Preeklent has not
area of a.ll US. a.lr bases outalde the conti- annoa:nud plana to create a l'latlona.l As·
nental United St&tea. It covers such a. vast eembly u e.lled !or under a new 1973 Conarea that squatters operating aurreptltloualy stltullllon, pJebMeltee have been experimented
are s.ald to ba.ve raloed an e~tlm&ted e10 mil- with !rom time to time In rorms adapted from
lion worth of sugar cane on base Ianda laat old lndlgenOUII political practices. The Presiyoor. The Sublc Bay Nava.l Base comple% oc- dent recently re!errtll1 to the poeslblll:ty of
cupies 36,000 acres of land and encompaBBeS !ormtng an appointed eoneultatlve body, a
26,000 acres of water. Much of the land with- Legl.alatlve Ad1'18ory Council.
tn the boundaries of both basee Is not used
There Is no Indication or when martlal law
!or direct military purpoaes.
will end. Nor are there any Indications of a
Fl!teen thousru1d U.S. servicemen are sta- broad public demand !or Ita termination.
tioned at the bnsee, and they are supple- VIsible evidences of martial Ia w are few;
mented by 47,000 Filipino employeee. The thel'll are far !ewer uniforms. !or example, on
197~ budget !or Clark and Sublc wa.s t232
the streets of J.fanlla than on those or Waahmllllon. The bases represent a maJor ln'I'Mt- lngton. For an practlca.l purposes, the sysment !Of' the United States, a maJor p&yroll tem amounts to rule by Presidential decree,
tar the Philippines and the prtnclpa.l current with curbs on civil llbertiM. While the CathoIssue between the two oountr!es.
llc hierarchy, ae such, Ja not actively aligned
The M&nlla government has announced against martial law. some opposition does
that 1n negotiations for a new base as- oome from eegments of the Church, particument, It ...Ul be guided by theee prlnclplee: larly thO<Oe which Include a. number of forto give added lmpetua to Pblllpplne eelf-re- eign clergy. A few members of the proscribed
llance, to enhance respect for the territoriAl legislature are a.lso outspoken critics. So,
Integrity and sovereignty of the Phlllpptnes too, are oert.a1n old Plllplno families of great
and to help ma.lntaln a ba.lance of power m wealth whose holdings and lnJ'luence have
the region. The Unl ted Staetea hae acknowl- been drMtlca.lly curta.lled and who charge
edged PhUipplne sovereignty over the bee& that theee prerequleltes have been sblited
area but, In !act, oontlnues to exercise aspects to others. In genera.!, however, the Improveof eoverelgnty. Theee carry-overs ol the form- ments tn pubUe safety and economic weller oolonlal relationship are a major point at being which are .._,.,lated with martial law
lseue. What concerns the Phlllpplnee WM have won, at a. minimum, general acquiesclearly st&ted by President Marcoe on July 7, cence.
1975.
-There are two ~or Insurgency problems
•·we want to put an end to the practice of In the Philippine.~. Both have roots which
ext ra-territoriality In our country In keeping streteh back Into pre-Independence days. One
"ltb our dignity as a. sovereign Republic and Is the New People's Army (NPA). It Ia a
In keeping with the developments of our guerrUia. orpnbatlon based on Luzon which
times. We want to 1188ume control of a.11 U.S. has an ldeologlca.l bnse derived from Chinbases and put them to a productive eco- communism. Ita baalc armed etrengtb Ja esnomic, ae well na mUltary use."
timated at 1,800. There Is also the Muslim
Negotiation of a. new status !or the basoo, rebelllon In the south centered In Western
from the PbUlpplne potnt of view, Involve Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
three matn Issues . ( 1) ''l"'llpln1za.tJon" of
The rebellion traces back to ancient dis·
the bases or elimination of extra-territorial
carry-overs; (2) use of portions of the bases pules between the Musllml! who first occupied
Mlnda.Da.o In the 12th Century and the
for oo=erclal purposes and economic development which can be on a Joint bnsts; and Christiana who arrived centuries later. It 1.1 a
controversy
which baa been fueled tn recent
(3) return of portloUB o! the bnse Ianda.
yeara by aid to the lnBurgente !rom Libya and
D1lllcult negotlatlona may be ahead. It Sabah and by encroachments on Muslim
should be reiterated, however, that the Ianda from an expanding Christian populaPhlllpptnes government etre.'8&S that It has tion Intent tn economic development. EBtlno desire to embarrass the United Statee. matel Indicate that there are at least 6.000
Nor, lt should be added, do tbe U.S. com- Musllma under arms. The tnaurgency Is a eenmands at the baaes fall to recogniZe that the sltlve Issue for the government tntern&lly
old days ot the dependency are over. Our since Musllml! make up about 7 percent ·or
!orees can rema.ln usefully In the Phlllpplnes the popula.tlon. There Is also concern ov«
only If their preaence accords with today'a sympathy for the rebele !rom abroad which
rea.!Jtles which Include a heightened sense of might lead to en<k>l'8elllent or a more a.ctlvlst
Philippine nationalism and a s tro ng em- policy by Mu.ollm nat1one, especially tboee In
phAsil on eelt-rel!ance .
a position to cut oJI ln06t of the petroleum
supply of the lsla.nda.
On the part of th<l Philippin e.• , there Is
contemporary value tn the contribution
The Philippine mllltary, which takes 15
which the ba8ee can continue to mnke to percent or the natlona.l budget, hM more
Philippine 1!8CU.l'lty, to regional lllablllty, and than doubled tn al.7.e largely because of the
to the eeonomy. On the part of the United rebelllon. About 80 percent or the combat
Bt&~ the baaee, as noted, are elements In
forcee are t1e<l up tn the eou t h where they are
the defense of the United States and Its In- suffering subat&ntlal attrltlon. About 76 were
terests tn the Pacific. The need Is fo r a new I<Uied In action monUl.ly durmg the 11.rat half
relationship which will reJ'lect these mutual of this year. Accord InS to U .S . olllcl.als, n.o
ln\t!reeta In the llght or altered c!rcum- U.S. military penonael are permitted to go
&taneee. II bon> ti.S . and Filipino olllc1al.8 Into the COIIlbat- and no U B. penonnel
approe.cb the negotiations with a rea.llatlc are ln...,I'Oed 1n Ute m!Mtary situation.
undenJtandlng of their own and each otber·a
In Saudi A»abta, ae noted, mc!leatlons were
neede, there Ia every reason to expect that a recehed of t»e poaatblllty of a negotiated
aatv.r..ctory agr eement enn be reached settlement of the Insurrection. It wns oald
promptly.
that agreement on a oease-tlre btnged on
Politlcaland uonomlc 1ltuatlon
autonomous at.aLua for Muslim areaa wlthln
The Philippines has been governed under the Republic and a government-sponsored
martJallaw since 1972. Preak1ent Marcos, who program of e:rtena.lve eoclal Improvements. As
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St&U>e. Therefore, a Ia more aecurate, m
my Ju~nt, to atate that It Ia DOt 1bat
the Ftllplnoe are loelng conftc1enoe 1n the
United S ~ aa some have eontell~; but,
rath r thl!.t they are gaining contldence lu
themselves.
In a speech on May ~ . 1976, Pre$14ent
F~rdlna.nd E. Marcoe outlined t h - guidelines for a new foreign policy:
"l"'rst, to lnten.slty, a.long a broader .fteld,
onr relations with the members of ABEAN;
"Second, to pul'tiue more vigorously the
.,.tabllstonent of dlplomaUo relaUons wtth
Socla.ilst statee. In particular with the People'a Republic of China and with the Soviet
Union:
-rhlrd, to seek closer ldenWicatlon with
the Third World with whom we share elmliar problems;
"Fourth, to contluue our beueficla.l relatlollllhlp with Japan;
"FUth. to support the Arab countries In
their struggle !nr a Just and enduring pea<:e
In the Middle East; and
"Finally. to .ftnd a new basis, compatible
with the emerg:ng real1tles In Asia, for a oontlnutng healthy relationship with the United
St&tes."
As a result of a visit to Peking by Preeldent Marcos In June, 1976, the Republic of
the Philippines est&bllshed diplomatic relations v.'lth China. Such tlee o.lBo exist with
all of the Communist nations of Eastern
Europe, except Albania and the Soviet Union
and formalization of relations with the latter expected to be only a matter of Ume.
ElTorts are being made to est.abllsh relation.. with euccessor governmente In Indochina. At the time of my visit, however, the
new government In Cambodia had not responded to a Philippine stAtement of recognition. Talks hnve been under way In Pl!.rls
on the establishment of diplomatic relations
with North VIetnam but Initiatives have not
yet been taken on the resumption of relations
"'ltb Saigon.
The Philippines Is a stroni: supporter of
ASEAN which Is eeen as something of a !ul~rum . Through this medium, :ManUa Is seekIng greater cooperation on economic matters &nd the creation of a "zone of peace,
freedom, and neutrallt y" In Southeast Asia.
The Republic Is also moving to eetabllsh
better relations with other Third World nations. One a.spect of pollcy bears a relationship to the Muslim problem In the south
since the :Middle Ea.etern nations are aympathetlc to their co-religionists In the Philippine•. They are also the source of most of
the petroleum used In the Republic. In
Saudi Arabia, an Impression waa conveyed
that the Arab states were prepared to do
" h at they could to promote a reconciliation
between the Musllms and Manlla.
In Philippine eyes as well aa In Thailand's
the SEATO organizatio n has outlived Jl.:!
uu!ulness. However. tlte question of the
. ianlla ract baa not yet been addres,;ed, alt hough It adds little to Philippine sec urity
since It ove rlaps the bilateral Mutual Security Treaty with the United State'!.
President Marcoe baa oa.lled for a reexamlnMion of a.ll U.S.-PbUlpplne security arr:mgementa . Thee& arrangements consist of a
Military Ba.ae Agreement which dates from
1 1!7 a.ltd runs until 1991 , a Mutua.! Security
Treaty entered Into ln 1952, and a 19~ MIUtary AM!s an~e Agreament which !Of'ms the
framework !or the U .S . mU!tary &.1<1 proG m . The stress of the Pre.ldent's propoeal
• o n tho base accords.•
As a P;t,elQc nation. the United Stat... has
1 ttereets In the region which are aa ext&n·
• \e as th e ocea.n ; retention of tbo mutua.!
<."Urlty trta.ty with the Philippines Ia. prently, a major element In the mUit.ry prot.<>Ctlon of thO<Oe lnterl.'6ts. Oon•ereely, Phlllpptne securJ•y comee under the umbrella of

th1a accord. I1 anythl.nc. the latter'• oonoeru
Ia thAt operation of tbe pact be more auto-

ecaUM lllel Ria announced !'0"1 .,
the troo.........,. ola N.,.. Society, l!eearlbed ..,
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of this writing, however, the government and
the rebels seem as far apart as ever on the
specifics of autonomy. Nor Is there much
likelihood of .social and economto improvements being carried out in any su'betantie.l
way while fighting Is In progress.
Not wit hstanding these internal difficulties,
the performance of the Philippines' economy
reflectS considerable improvement over past
years. The 34 percent rate of Inflation in 1974 ,
has declined drastically. Food prices a.re Increasing now at an annual rate of only 6.5

percent whlle non-food prices are going up
by 8.4 percent. By conservative appraisals, it
is expected that the overall rate in 1976 .will
be 15-20 percent.
The Phllippine government takes an active
role in the economy which includes the planning of development and the imposition of
price controls on some commodities. The
reliance on imports is still heavy in order to
meet consumer needs but t his is expected to
change as the new stress on independence

and self-reliance extends more deeply into
the nation's economtc life. Last year exports
were $2.7 billion and imports $3.1 b!llion.
Nevertheless, the year ended with a $60 mtlHon favorable over-all balance of payments
due to toreign capitalinfiow, foreign aid and
tourism. It Is estimated that the trade deficit
for 1975 may reach $700 mlll!on, due in large
measure to the decllne in sugar prices and
depressed market conditions for coconut

products and lumber and the increase in the
prices of imported i terns.
Japan is the leading exporter to the Phllippines and the United States is second with
23 percent of the market. Forty-three percent
of Philippine exports go to the United States
and In 1974 they produced for that nation a
favorable bllateral balance of $400 million.
Private and official u.s. credits to the Phlllppines total nearly· $3 blll!on U.S. equity investments have an e stimated market value ot
$2 billion.
The expiration of the Laurel-Langley
Agreement in July, 1974 ended all remaining
bilateral tariff preferences with the Ph!l!ppines. At the same time, U.S. firms lost their
exemptions from general Philippine restrictions on foreign investment:. This adjustment has been brought about without major
problems and U.S. firms are reported to be
doing well in the new situation. Negotiations
have not yet commenced on a new treaty of
commerce but the way has now been cleared
by the passage o! the 1974 Trade Act.
The Philippines receives assistance, mostly
loans, from the United States and from international institutions. U.S. economic aid
totaled $56 mtllion In fiscal year 1975. At the
same time, the World Bank provided $209
mllllon in loans and Is expected to furnish
$260 million for FY 1976. Assistance is also
provided through the Asian Development
Bank which is headquartered in Manila., with
some $100 mlllion expected from the Bank in
the current fiscal year.
While foreign investment Is welcomed, it is
admitted on a. selective basis which Is designed to enhance economic self-rel!a.nce and
balanced development. Except In unusual
circumstances, such as in newly opened areas,
rorelgn equity is limited to 40 percent.
There is stU! a great gap in living standards between urban and rural areas. However,
emphasis in development is being put on
the rural areas and there are indications that
its share of natlone.l Income Is Increasing.
With one of the highest birth rates in the
world, the Phillppine population Is growing
rapidly. From 20 mlllion at the time of Independence in 1946 the Increase has been to
42 million today and the total could reach
100 million by the end of the century. A majority of the country's population Is under 16
years of age. In practical terms, the growth
rate each year means 2 m11J1on mouths to
feed and a. requirement for 600,000-700,000
new jobs.

Petroleum

Exploration for petroleum oll'ers the poaslbll!ty of adding a strong stimulus to the
Phll!ppines economy. Thirteen major groups,
prlma.rlly Flllpino-U.S. joint ventures, hold
concessions both onshore and offshore notably in the sea. west of the Island of Pe.la.wa.n.
No strikes have yet been reported but extensive test-drllling has not yet taken place
so It Is too early to estimate the Pt'ospects.
All of the country's requirements of 70
million barrels of·crude per day are now Imported. The Mideast Is the major source but
increased amounts are coming from other
sources such as Barawak, Indonesia., and the
People's Republic of China.. Whatever the
outcome of its own petroleum exploration,
the Pblllppines intends to achieve Independence from fossll fuels through development of
geo-thermal resources and nuclear power. It
Is expected that this goe.l will be reached
on the main Island of Luzon by 1985.
Summary

In summary, the Phlllpplne Republic is experiencing a period of growing national assertion and economic progress. At the same
time, Its ties with the United States which
go back three quarters of a century are in
transition. What Is Involved In this transition of principal concern to the United
States are the vestiges of the previous dependency relationship which, in my judgment, no longer accord with the enduring interests of either nation. There Is a need for
a reshaping of attitudes and arrangements
which will reflect the changes that have
taken place within the Phlllpplnes and in the
Pacific and tbe world. The future of the
Philippines Is bright and so, too, can be the
outlook for continjled cooperation and beneficle.l interchange with the United States If
the adjustments which are now required are
made in good time and are managed with
sensitivity and understanding--on both
sides.
V, POSTSCRIPT

China's petroleum potential

Reference has been made throughout this
study to petroleum developments in the regIon of Southeast Asia.• Far more significant,
are the developments associated with the
People's Republic of China.. There Is widespread interest In the subject and It bas
prompted this postscript whlob Is based on
the latest Informat ion which was made available to me during the course of the mission.
It supplements observations derived from
my last visit to China In 1974 which were
reported to the Committee In January 1975.'
Since that time, there have been additional
lndlcatlons that China may soon emerge as
the world's next great oil producer. No one,
not even the Chinese , know the country's
full petroleum potential, either onshore or
offshore. Outside experts agree, however, that
It Is vast with estimates of reserves ranging
from 30 billion to 60 billion barrels. China's
peak production before 1949 was slightly
more than 300,000 tons annually but by
1970 It had increased to 18 mtlllon tons.
In recent years production has grown by
more than 20 percent annually and in 1976
ts likely to exceed 80 m!lllon metric tons.
This rate of increase Is expected to continue
for at least the next five years. If this proves
to be the case, 1980 production will be about
three times the 1973 level. One observer ·
wrote recently that "Peking appears likely
to reach the current production level of
Saudi Arabia by 1988 or hereafter," • (i.e.,
some 8 m1llion barrels a. day or 400 mtllion
tons a year). As much as half of that output
could be available for export, a. formidable
factor in relationships with the oil-hungry
nations of the world.
China. Is expected to export 8 mlllion tons
Footnotes at end of article.
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of oU to Japan In 1975, and sme.Iler, quantities to th~ Philippines, Thailand, North Korea., &114 North Vietnam. Exporte to the
Phlllpplnea are continuing at a. rate of 14,
000 barrels per day and additional sales may
be made to The.lla.nd. Some dll!lculty has
been encountered In refining Chinese crude
to Japan, the Phlllpplnes, and Thailand
where existing equipment Is not designed to
ha.n<Ue the high wax content.
New fields onshore In China. are being
brought In and drilllng Is proceeding at several offshore loca.ttcm.s. Although there have
been no announcements or offshore discoverIes by the Chinese, some observers believe
that the drilling now in progrt\ss is as much
for the purpose of mastering technlq ues as
it Is to find oil. Drilling has been under way
in th\) Po Hal Gulf for two years and commenced late last year In the Yellow Sea near
Shanghai, with a Chinese built rig.
There has also been activity on one of the
Paracel Islands, claimed by both Vietna.ms
a1,1d_some prospecting around Ha.lnan Island:
An oil potential exists in th«t Senkaku Islands area which lle north of Taiwan and are
claimed by China., Japan, and Taiwan. Apparently, there has been no drllling by AmerIcan companies in any area disputed by
Japan.
There Is not only a great potential for oil
along the continental shelf of Asia but also
much potential for trouble in view of the
many overlapping cla,ms. Thus far, the
United Sta.tee has stayed out of these conflicts and, should continue to do so. In my
judgment, an essential element of our policy, Is to discourage private U.S. prospecting
in any areas In significant International
dispute.
Excerpts from ,my January 1975 report to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
concerning ·China's oil situation are re-

printed below:
Petroleum

In 1973 China entered the International
oil market with the sale of one m!lllon tons
of crude oil to Japan and, In th& following
year, entered Into arrangements for substan.
tie.! shipments to tp.e Philippines. The latter commitment was made in conjunction
with the well-received visit of Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, the wife of the Philippine's President.
China. has been self-sufficient In petroleum since 1966 and for several years prior to
the 1973 sale to Japan, had been exporting
petroleum products to North Vietnam, North
Korea, and Albania.. The Chinese are now

looking to crude oil as a. major earner of
foreign exchange, to help finance increased

imports of industrial plants and equipment.
The old slogan, "oil for the lamps of China,"
used by Western traders to exploit China for
so long, has been given an Ironic twist.
The continental shelf off China's shore,
particularly the areas between Taiwan and
Japan and under the Yellow Sea, are considered by many petroleum experts to contain
soq>.e of the richest oil reserves in the world.
China. 's coastllne extends from the Bay of
Korea In the North to the Gulf of Tonkin in
the South and the, continental shelf slopes
gently out as far as 200 miles In some places.
No one really knows how great the offshore
potential is since exploration began only
recently. Deep sea. drilling rigs have been
bought from Japan and additional exploration equipment has been purchased from
the United States and other countries. However, most of the petroleum technology being
used to develop China's oil resources, off-

shore and on land, is China's own. China recently ann.ounced, for example, the bringing
In of Its first offshore well In the Yellow
Sea., using a rig bullt In a Shanghai shipyard.
There will be thorny International problems In developing some of the offshore oil
potential along Asia's periphery. Following
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the publl
on ot the r U.lt ol a 1968 Unlt.ed
Nation a sponsored geopby&lcal aur<ey ot the
ChlnA!5e conUnental abel!, Taiwan, Japan
and South Korea each advan ed o'erlapplllg
claims to parts or the region In December
1070 th• I eople's Rcpu lie !J sued Its claim
to the contlneotal shelf and to owner&hlp or
Ule Scnkaltu It>LJ.nds, although the latter are
alllO claimed by Japan and Talv. an. WhUe
U.S policy Is to lend no encour •gement to
exp ra•ton In the dl puted areas, some u.s.
companies hi\\C obtained conce :;)tons !rom
Tal,.an. Specifically, tbe'le e<•rporatlons are
Oul!, Amoco, ca.noco, Oceanic, Clinton and
Tex1 I Several or the concessions lle oft the
Sen.kuus However, no U.S. drllilng oper a tiona have yet been conducted In that area
but Amoco. Gull and Conoco have been Involved In c!rllllng otr the west coast ot Taiwan
1n the Taiwan a~nLi ts, with the work being
done by Amer lcan-o..,'tled vessels o! fore ign
r eg\lltry and manned by foreign creWB. Ther e
h a ve been no U.S. Government Investment
&uaranteea 1 ued !or these drllllng opera t.lona.
Tbere 1s also an oll potential In the P aracel
Island s, southeast o! VIetnam, claimed by
both South VIetnam and China but occupied
aolely by China. In tact, the People'• Republlc bad a drilling rlg on one of the !&lando at
t he time or a mllltary encounter ther e be t ween the two co11ntr les In 1974. There are
also confilctlng elalm.B of China, South Vletna.m, the Phlllpplnea and Taiwan to the
Spratly Iolanda which al&o lie to the souther.st ot VIetnam. With oll reserves an lnenaslngly Important Mset, overlapping
claims oft the Asian 11 t torals con taln the
seeds or very ser1ous dl11lcultles. While the
Unlt.ed States should not shirk participation
tn International etl'orts to deal In a r ational
way with these dlmcultles, we s hould n ot
provide j~overnment Incentives or otherwise
lend encourngement to companies which
w!ab to pl11nge ahead with exploration and
development Itt disputed areas.
In addlt.on to an offshore potential, China
has very promising Internal oll b~ar1ng
basins. In fact, the main emphRsls Is stlll on
land exploration. Estimates or China's total
,..,..rves hi\\ e been consistently revised upwards over tl•e !aRt ten years. Even approximate llgur<' on how much oll China may
have are not available The general view,
however, Is thnt the potential Is very great.
I was Informed that ChIna's oll production
was now "In the aarne range ""Algeria's, perhaps a little mort'" Chinese output Is Increasing at the rate o! twenty percent annually, If thla rate I rnalntslned, It would
pu h production to over 400 million tons by
1984, comp!>red with an estimated 60 mllllon
p lus tono In 1074, making China a major factor tn the v;orld petroleum trade.
China sol<! 5 million tons ot crude oll to
Japan In 1974, earning about $450 mllllon,
and Is aald to have committed 10 mllllon tons
tor 1975. Smaller amount• hM e been sold to
Ule Phlllpplnes and Thalland There are al&o
reports that China has otrcred to sell oll to
U «. compan•c Chinn' 197~ petroleum export8 are ~xpec tect to be double the 1974 level
anti to continue to cllmb as new produc lon
comes ln. Output Is limited only by a short•e of equipment and tmru<port
Some pertluent polnt8 about China's oil
export potentlnl 1\re brought O\lt by the following eJ< erpt !rom a r cent analysis:
" Pelting plans to expand oll exports mb•tantlally durtng the next nve years are borne
o 1t by the con truct!on ot new oll-handllnt;
f<><'llltles nt the ports of Cllln-hu!lng- tao nnd
Tlllngtao nd the purchase of dredging equipment needed to make Chine e ports deep
enough l.:>r large tankPn ot more than !50,000
owr to transport oll tor export. The tonnage
ot tankers In Ule Cbln
!n matlonal neet
h!\8 doubled In the put year nnd now tot Is
al~$ 200,000 DWT.

"Tbe goal o! 110 mWI01> tons ot erude oil
! or el!p<ll't In 1980 appeaza !eae!bla. Reserves
are large enough , even without P1'Q4uc tlon
!rom oltsbore Jlelds. I! production acoeieratea,
or e ven l:f It o nly con tlnues to grow at 22
percent--the rate achieved dur1ng 1965-1972-the PRC coUld export 50 million tons
In 1980 and etlll pro~lde a generons leeway
t or usiAg oll to modernize the economy."
As a developing country, China needs Increasing a m oaats of ~roleu m Tbe potential
! or ""port, therefore, may not be as great as
It seems a t !lrst glan ce although It should
be rubstlmtlal becau se the Chlneee do not
u se energy or a ny other commodi ty !or that
matter m a wa•tetul or prorugate manner.
I n deed, I! the United Sta~ follo wed. even a
par t of tbe Chinese practices In the use of
petr-.m, t his nat loll>' would be m ore than
self-su.!llclen t .
Blghty percent ot Ch-'s energy Is produced trom ooal, a11d ""'"' reserves are ""tlmated to be one-tbii'O!t of the world'll total.
Every provtnoe has aome coal. Lllte ott, coal
remains larply unexplolt.ed a n d could eventually becom e a major export earn.,..•
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